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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Internet service providers have begun to experiment 
with a variety of innovative business practices and new forms of network 
management in an attempt to meet end users’ ever increasing demand for 
more bandwidth and more sophisticated applications.  Perhaps most contro-
versially, Comcast began to interfere with the peer-to-peer file sharing ap-
plication known as BitTorrent by forcing connections associated with 
BitTorrent to terminate and reconnect.  The Federal Communications 
Commission found Comcast’s practices to be unreasonable, only to see the 
 
*  Professor of Law and Communication and Founding Director of the Center for Technology, Inno-
vation, and Competition, University of Pennsylvania.  Thanks to Julie Yao Cooper, Jennifer Escalas, 
Shane Greenstein, Daniel Levinthal, and the participants in the Conference on “Maturing Internet Stud-
ies” held at the Northwestern University School of Law on May 20, 2009, as well as participants in the 
Boston University Law School’s Law and Economics Workshop.  The author would like to thank the 
Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for its financial support for this project.  All errors are the re-
sponsibility of the author. 
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courts overturn that decision as exceeding the FCC’s statutory authority.1  
Comcast replaced this technique with a protocol-agonistic approach to net-
work management that does not target any particular application and is in-
voked only during times and in locations that are subject to congestion.2   
Other network providers are conserving bandwidth by giving higher 
priority to traffic associated with applications that are particularly sensitive 
to delay.  Among the most sophisticated is the UK’s Plusnet, which uses 
deep packet inspection (DPI) to divide the data stream into seven different 
levels of priority.3  Prioritizing traffic in this manner has enabled Plusnet to 
win numerous industry awards for the quality of its network connections 
and for customer satisfaction.4  AT&T’s U-verse takes a more limited ap-
proach to network management, compensating for its lack of bandwidth by 
giving priority to a single application: its proprietary video offering.5  Simi-
larly, Comcast’s voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) offering operates over 
a channel that is completely separate from the public Internet and that does 
not share bandwidth with other Internet-based applications.6 
Another development is the emergence of new forms of pricing.  For 
example, Time Warner Cable recently attempted to adopt the practice long 
followed by digital subscriber line (DSL) providers7 of offering different 
tiers of service that provide different levels of bandwidth, only to be forced 
 
1  Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) [he-
reinafter Comcast Order], petition for review granted sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 
(D.C. Cir. 2010).  The FCC has issued a notice of inquiry seeking comment on several possible alterna-
tive statutory bases for further FCC action.  Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of In-
quiry, FCC 10-114 (June 17, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-10-114A1.pdf. 
2  Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Comcast Corp., to Marlene 
H. Dortch, Secretary, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ 
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6520169715. 
3  Plusnet, Traffic Prioritisation http://www.plus.net/support/broadband/quality_broadband/traffic_ 
prioritisation.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); see also Transparency the Key to PlusNet’s Success, 
STAR (Sheffield, UK), Apr. 9, 2008, http://www.thestar.co.uk/business/Transparency-the-key-to-
PlusNet39s.3961139.jp. 
4  Plusnet, Press Centre: Awards, http://www.plus.net/press/awards.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 
2010). 
5  Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality after Comcast: Toward a Case-by-Case Approach to Rea-
sonable Network Management, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 55, 65–66 (Randolph 
J. May ed., 2009); see also AT&T and BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5814 (2007) (specifically excluding AT&T’s Internet proto-
col television (IPTV) services from its voluntary network neutrality commitment). 
6  Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Comcast Corp., to Dana 
Shaffer, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, & Matthew Berry, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n at 2 & n.7 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_ 
pdf=pdf&id_document=6520194593 (citing IP Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 
F.C.C.R. 4863, 4873 ¶ 11 & n.42 (2004)). 
7  See McGregor McCance, AT&T Broadband Plans Tiered Service, RICHMOND (VA) TIMES-
DISPATCH, June 16, 2002, at D8 (noting that “[t]iered pricing has long been a staple of DSL providers”). 
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to back down by criticism from the public and from network neutrality ad-
vocates.8  Some backbones and content providers have begun to experiment 
with paid peering and other interconnection relationships that require pay-
ment for traffic that was previously settlement free.9   
Still other network providers are entering into strategic partnerships 
with device manufacturers and content providers.  Perhaps the most salient 
recent example is Apple’s decision to make the iPhone available exclu-
sively on the AT&T wireless broadband network.10  Network providers 
have also given particular search engines preferred treatment, such as the 
2001 alliance of SBC—now AT&T—with Yahoo!;11 Google’s $500 million 
deal to serve as the default search engine on Clearwire’s new wireless 
broadband network;12 and Google’s recent efforts to negotiate a deal to be-
come the default search engine for the Verizon Wireless broadband net-
work, only to be outbid by Microsoft at the eleventh hour.13   
Proponents of the cluster of policy initiatives that fall under the banner 
of network neutrality have largely been skeptical of these developments.  
Some commentators have raised the concern that these types of practices 
would enable these network providers to act in an anticompetitive manner.14  
Others argue that they threaten innovation in content and applications.15   
I have discussed these claims at length elsewhere and need not rehearse 
these arguments here.16  Instead, this Essay explores another possible ex-
 
8  See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
179, 194; Nat Worden, Time Warner Cable Scraps Plan to Charge by Internet Use, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
17, 2009, at B3. 
9  On paid peering, see Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that Challenge 
the Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 95–99 (2010).  Another example is a service 
initially known as ESPN 360 and subsequently renamed ESPN3, which is unavailable to Internet sub-
scribers unless their last-mile provider pays a fee to the content provider.  See Yoo, supra note 8, at 238. 
10  Matt Richtel, In Cingular-Apple Deal, Only a Phone Was Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at 
C1. 
11  Nick Wingfield, Yahoo and SBC Will Join Forces to Offer High-Speed Web Access, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 15, 2001, at B8. 
12  Ted Hearn, Merger Mum on Google; Not Much on Net Neutrality in Clearwire’s 300-Page FCC 
Filing, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, June 23, 2008, at 34, available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/ 
85594-Merger_Mum_on_Google.php. 
13  Amol Sharma et al., Microsoft Tries to Steal Verizon Deal from Google, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 
2008, at B1; Bloomberg News, Microsoft Taps Dell, Verizon in Search Battle with Google, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 11, 2009, at 7E. 
14  See, e.g., Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regu-
lation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 333 (2007). 
15  See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 35–37, 39–41, 138–40, 156 (2001); Tim 
Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 141, 141–46 
(2003). 
16  See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Compe-
tition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004) [herein-
after Yoo, Comment on End-to-End]; Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 
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planation for the emergence of these practices that the literature has com-
pletely overlooked, specifically the manner in which the nature of competi-
tion and innovation change as industries mature.  Part I reviews the 
literature on the theory of the “product life cycle” developed by marketing 
scholars, which examines how the nature of competition changes as demand 
growth begins to flatten and the market begins to reach saturation.  Part II 
discusses the scholarship on “dominant designs,” to see how standardiza-
tion affects the nature of innovation.  Part III examines the literature on the 
sociology of technology, which studies how the emergence of a technologi-
cal paradigm affects scientific progress.  Part IV considers the literature on 
transaction cost economics and complementary assets, which explains how 
market maturity affects market structure.  Part V applies these various theo-
ries to the Internet and discusses the critiques and limitations of these theo-
ries.  This Essay concludes that many of the business practices that are 
criticized in the current policy debate may well be nothing more than a re-
flection of the industry’s inevitable maturation.   
                                                                                                                          
Admittedly, product life cycle theory’s inability to predict precisely 
when and how the nature of competition will shift has limited its usefulness 
as a tool for business strategy.  From the standpoint of regulatory policy, 
however, these shortcomings are less problematic.  Recognizing that the na-
ture of competition will change at some point cautions against regulatory 
policies that categorically prohibit the types of practices associated with 
market maturity even if the theory does not permit policymakers to antici-
pate exactly when these phase shifts will occur.  A case-by-case approach 
that places the burden of proof on the party challenging the practice would 
give firms the flexibility they need to experiment with new solutions to re-
spond to changing conditions.  Any other approach might well prevent the 
industry from following its natural evolutionary path.   
I. PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE THEORY: THE IMPACT OF DEMAND 
SATURATION ON THE NATURE OF COMPETITION 
The best-known and best-established theory of market maturation is 
the product life cycle theory pioneered by marketing scholars during the 
1950s and 1960s.17  Although variants of the product life cycle theory ex-
 
1847 (2006) [hereinafter Yoo, Economics of Congestion]; Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Con-
tribute to the Network Neutrality Debate?, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 493 (2007); Yoo, supra note 8; Yoo, supra 
note 5.  That said, certain aspects, such as Comcast’s failure to disclose its network management prac-
tices, are difficult (if not impossible) to justify.  See Comcast Order, supra note 1, at 13058–59 ¶¶ 52–
53. 
17  The seminal work on product life cycle theory is Joel Dean’s Pricing Policies for New Products, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 1950, at 45.  For other noteworthy early discussions, see Jay W. Forrester, In-
dustrial Dynamics, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1958, at 37; Arch Patton, Stretch Your Product’s Earn-
ing Years, MGMT. REV., June 1959, at 9; Theodore Levitt, Exploit the Product Life Cycle, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Nov.–Dec. 1965, at 81; William E. Cox, Jr., Product Life Cycles as Marketing Models, 40 J. BUS. 
375 (1967).  The concept is discussed Michael Porter’s classic analysis of business strategy.  MICHAEL 
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ist,18 the predominant version posits that the sales history of a new product 
will follow an S-shaped curve over time and that the product will pass 
through the four stages of sales growth depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Product Life Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$ 
      Decline  Introduction        Growth      Maturity 
time 
 
 
 
During the introduction stage, the product’s novelty dictates that it will 
initially achieve only low sales volumes and slow sales growth, during 
which time the slope of the sales curve will remain relatively flat.  If the 
product is successful, this initial stage gives way to the growth stage, during 
which the upward slope of the sales curve increases, as market penetration 
accelerates and the product gains acceptance with a broader range of con-
sumers.  Over time, market saturation causes the product market to enter the 
maturity stage, during which the sales curve again flattens, and revenue is 
generated predominantly by sales to existing customers rather than to new 
customers.  Eventually, the product enters the decline stage, as the emer-
gence of technologically superior substitutes causes the sales curve to slope 
                                                                                                                           
E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 157–62 (1980).  It also figures prominently in leading marketing 
and strategy textbooks.  See PHILIP KOTLER & KEVIN LANE KELLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 278–
88 (13th ed. 2009); ROBERT M. GRANT, CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY ANALYSIS 265–75 (6th ed. 2008). 
18  See, e.g., CHESTER R. WASSON, DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND PRODUCT LIFE CYCLES 
3–10 (1978) (presenting an eight-stage product life cycle). 
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downward.  Empirical research has confirmed that many, if not most, prod-
uct markets follow the pattern predicted by product life cycle theory.19   
One key insight of product life cycle theory is that the nature of com-
petition will change as products proceed from one stage to the next.20  Dur-
ing the introduction stage, firms focus on inducing potential early adopters 
to try the product.  Little focus is placed on price and product quality, in 
part because early adopters tend to be risk tolerant and price insensitive and 
in part because low sales volumes prevent firms from standardizing produc-
tion processes, realizing any significant economies of scale, or obtaining 
any significant benefits from learning by doing.  As the industry transitions 
from the introductory phase into the growth phase, firms expand beyond 
early adopters to target the mass market and engage in what is sometimes 
called “extensive” competition, in which firms race to serve new customers 
who are entering the market segment.21   
The most important transition for the purposes of this Essay is the shift 
from the growth phase to the maturity phase of the life cycle.  Extensive 
competition, which focuses on obtaining new customers, gives way to “in-
tensive” competition, which focuses on delivering more value to customers 
who are already in the market and on stealing customers already in the mar-
ket from competitors.22  Firms compete by improving quality, offering a 
broader range of product flankers targeted at market segments, and bun-
dling their core product with other services.23  The flattening of sales 
growth and the standardization of products also intensifies price competi-
tion.24  Price competition is sharpened further by the growing sophistication 
of customers, as they become more familiar with the product and how it is 
 
19  See SAK ONKVISIT & JOHN J. SHAW, PRODUCT LIFE CYCLES AND PRODUCT MANAGEMENT 97–
98 (1989) (reviewing the empirical evidence and citing study concluding that more than eighty percent 
of products investigated followed the classic product life cycle curve); Peter Doyle, The Realities of the 
Product Life Cycle, Q. REV. MKTG., Summer 1976, at 1, 3 (reviewing the empirical literature and con-
cluding that “[s]ales of most, though not all, products broadly follow the PLC pattern”); David R. Rink 
& John E. Swan, Product Life Cycle Research: A Literature Review, 7 J. BUS. RES. 219, 221–22, 238 
(1979) (reviewing the empirical literature and concluding that “[t]he weight of evidence suggests that 
the most common curve is the classical, but it is not the only PLC”).  
20  For overviews of changes in the nature of competition during each stage of the product life cycle, 
see, for example, GRANT, supra note 17, at 271; KOTLER & KELLER, supra note 17, at 281–88; PORTER, 
supra note 17, at 159–61; Nariman K. Dhalla & Sonia Yuspeh, Forget the Product Life Cycle Concept!, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1976, at 102, 104. 
21  See Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communications, 1893–1920, 34 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 340, 345 (1969). 
22  KOTLER & KELLER, supra note 17, at 288; Levitt, supra note 17, at 89. 
23  GRANT, supra note 17, at 271; PORTER, supra note 17, at 159. 
24  See Dean, supra note 17, at 52; Levitt, supra note 17, at 83; Patton, supra note 17, at 12–13. 
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sold.25  The intensification of price competition often causes an industry 
shakeout and places a higher premium on reducing costs.26 
The sales history of black-and-white televisions provides an apt illus-
tration of the dynamics of the product life cycle.  During the introduction 
stage, television sets had small screens and significant technical problems.  
These problems did not prove insuperable, as early adopters were relatively 
tolerant of poor performance.27 
As the market for televisions entered the growth stage, sales skyrock-
eted to the point where retailers struggled to keep sets in stock.  The number 
of manufacturers exploded, numbering as many as sixty within two years 
and exceeding one hundred within four years of the product’s introduc-
tion.28  Manufacturers engaged in a race for the market, both in terms of 
capturing distribution channels and consumers.  The strength of the market 
demand ensured that margins and profits remained very high.  The shift to 
the mass market and customers’ growing sophistication made them more 
demanding and less tolerant of performance problems. 
As the market transitioned into the maturity stage, the slowdown in 
sales growth caused the nature of competition to change.  Price competition 
intensified, with the number of manufacturers dwindling to thirty-five.29  
Firms became increasingly cost conscious, and instead of trying to capture 
new customers, they began to offer products that were higher in quality as 
well as portable televisions and other line extensions that were targeted at 
niches within the larger market.30 
Product life cycle theory provides important insights of how the nature 
of competition changes as markets mature.  As consumer adoption ap-
proaches saturation, future revenue growth depends not on attracting new 
customers, but rather on delivering greater value to customers who are al-
ready in the market. 
II. DOMINANT DESIGN THEORY: THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT 
STANDARDIZATION ON THE NATURE OF INNOVATION 
While marketing-oriented management scholars analyzed how the pat-
tern of sales growth affected the nature of competition, a parallel line of re-
search pioneered by William Abernathy and James Utterback explored how 
 
th ed. 2008); George S. Day, 
The ssues, J. MKTG., Fall 1981, at 60, 63. 
T, supra note 17, at 275; Richard G. Hamermesh & Steven B. Silk, How to Compete in 
Sta es, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1979, at 161, 164–65. 
ra note 17, at 71–72. 
25  See DAVID A. AAKER, STRATEGIC MARKET MANAGEMENT 66 (8
 Product Life Cycle: Analysis and Applications I
26  See GRAN
gnant Industri
27  Patton, sup
28  Id. at 72. 
29  Id. at 76. 
30  Id. at 77. 
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market maturation affects the nature of innovation.31  Although inspired by 
product life cycle theory,32 dominant design theory differs in that the key 
milestone turns on the standardization of the product rather than sales 
growth.33  While Abernathy and Utterback initially argued that innovation 
proceeds in a series of three distinct phases,34 they later simplified the 
analysis into two basic phases, with the division between those two phases 
mar
 
inste
ked by the emergence of a dominant design.35   
According to Abernathy and Utterback, when a technological break-
through first emerges, considerable uncertainty exists about which product 
features will appeal most to consumers and about the best technological 
means for providing those features.36  During this period, product design 
remains in a state of flux, as firms experiment with different technological 
approaches to satisfying consumers’ needs.  Furthermore, the lack of prod-
uct standardization offers little reward to specialization in operations and
ad gives the advantage to production processes that remain flexible.37   
At some point, the basic product features and the preferred technologi-
cal means for delivering those features to consumers coalesce into a domi-
nant design.  The product standardization implicit in the emergence of a 
dominant design heightens price competition in a manner similar to that 
predicted by product life cycle theory.38  At the same time, the emergence 
of a dominant design also brings about a number of changes to the nature of 
innovation.  For example, standardization increases the cost of major prod-
uct changes while also providing greater rewards to process innovations.39  
What little product innovation that remains will be limited to minor modifi-
 
31  See James M. Utterback & William J. Abernathy, A Dynamic Model of Process and Product In-
novation, 3 OMEGA INT’L J. MGMT. SCI. 639 (1975) [hereinafter Utterback & Abernathy, Dynamic 
 E. Tilton, Research and Development Costs as a Barrier to En-
try,
y, 1 RES. ON TECH. 
INN 83).  
Technological Disconti-
nui 1986).   
& Utterback, Industrial Innovation, supra note 31, at 44–45. 
upra note 31, at 644–46. 
Model]; William J. Abernathy & James M. Utterback, Patterns of Industrial Innovation, TECH. REV., 
June/July 1978, at 41 [hereinafter Abernathy & Utterback, Industrial Innovation].  For an important an-
tecedent, see Dennis C. Mueller & John
 2 CANADIAN J. ECON. 570 (1969). 
32  Utterback & Abernathy, Dynamic Model, supra note 31, at 643. 
33  WILLIAM J. ABERNATHY ET AL., INDUSTRIAL RENAISSANCE 24 (1983); Kim B. Clark, Competi-
tion, Technical Diversity, and Radical Innovation in the U.S. Auto Industr
OVATION, MGMT. & POL’Y 103, 112–13 (Richard S. Rosenbloom ed., 19
34  Utterback & Abernathy, Dynamic Model, supra note 31, at 641–45.  
35  Abernathy & Utterback, Industrial Innovation, supra note 31, at 44.  For other representative de-
scriptions, see, for example, Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation: The Re-
configuration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
9, 13–14 (1990); Steven Klepper, Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle, 86 
AM. ECON. REV. 562, 562–63 (1996); Michael L. Tushman & Philip Anderson, 
ties and Organizational Environments, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 439, 441 (
36  Utterback & Abernathy, Dynamic Model, supra note 31, at 643. 
37  Abernathy 
38  Id. at 44.  
39  Utterback & Abernathy, Dynamic Model, s
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cations that 
sign.
 2: Dominant Design Theory and the Shift from Product to                           
rocess Innovation 
 
 by trial and error,41 and tends to become more incre-
men
do not require any major revisions to the product’s basic de-
40 
 
 
Figure
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reduction in uncertainty associated with the emergence of a domi-
nant design also causes research and development to become more formal-
ized and systematic.  As a result, innovation becomes more science-
oriented, less driven
Rate of  
Innovation 
Process innovation 
Product innovation 
     time 
tal.42  The empirical literature largely corroborates the predictions of 
dominant design theory.43  As a result, dominant design theory has appeared 
prominently in many of the leading books on industrial organization and 
business strategy.44 
 
NG & SOC. CHANGE 379, 391 (1975); Utterback & Abernathy, Dynamic Model, supra 
not
Battles for Tech-
nol
DVANTAGE 194–95 (1985); OLIVER E. 
WI RCHIES 215–16 (1975). 
40  ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 33, at 24. 
41  William J. Abernathy & Phillip L. Townsend, Technology, Productivity and Process Change, 7 
TECH. FORECASTI
e 31, at 646. 
42  Abernathy & Townsend, supra note 41, at 391. 
43  For reviews of the empirical literature on dominant designs, see Johann Peter Murmann & Koen 
Frenken, Toward a Systematic Framework for Research on Dominant Designs, Technological Innova-
tions, and Industrial Change, 35 RES. POL’Y 925, 926–30 (2006); Fernando F. Suarez, 
ogical Dominance: An Integrative Framework, 33 RES. POL’Y 271, 272–73 (2004). 
44  See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE A
LLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERA
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Again, the history of black-and-white televisions provides a useful case 
in point.  During the industry’s initial stages, the product was highly non-
stan
as organized flexibly as a job shop, employing trade 
craftsmen wielding general-purpose tools.  Once the Model T emerged as a 
ploy ts dramati-
cally.  These exa the emergence of a 
dom
to the automobile industry effected by the oil 
shocks and the entry by Japanese automakers during the 1970s, however, 
forced these scholars to grapple with the dynamics of industry “dematur-
ity,” in which an industry may move away from a dominant design.50  Even 
so, they tended to attribute such changes to exogenous forces, such as the 
dardized, employing both round and rectangular screens in a wide vari-
ety of sizes.45  The fast pace of technological improvements required that 
manufacturers redesign the product each year, which led them to employ a 
wide number of models and chassis.  But the emergence of a dominant de-
sign slowed the pace of product innovation and placed greater emphasis on 
manufacturing expertise.46 
Another classic example is the automobile industry.47  During its earli-
est years, the Ford Motor Company developed and produced five different 
engines, which employed anywhere from two to six cylinders.  The manu-
facturing facility w
dominant design, Henry Ford was able to embark on his now legendary de-
ment of mass production processes that lowered product cos
mples illustrate the key role that 
inant design plays in shaping the nature of competition, innovation, and 
industry structure. 
III. TECHNOLOGY TRAJECTORIES AND DESIGN HIERARCHIES:  
THE IMPACT OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY  
ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Although the original proponents of dominant design theory conceded 
that the movement toward a single technological approach may “stop for 
long periods, or even reverse,”48 the overall thrust of their arguments sug-
gested that the movement toward standardization was generally unidirec-
tional and that any deviations from this pattern would be extremely rare.49  
The significant changes 
 
note 17, at 72. 
4. 
ant design “is not necessarily irreversible, the evidence to date indicates that it is highly di-
rec
 at 21, 27; JAMES M. 
UT
45  Patton, supra 
46  Id. at 74–75. 
47  Abernathy & Utterback, Industrial Innovation, supra note 31, at 4
48  Utterback & Abernathy, Dynamic Model, supra note 31, at 645. 
49  Murmann & Frenken, supra note 43, at 935 (“In the original formulation of dominant designs, 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978) suggest that dominant designs emerge once in the evolution of a par-
ticular product class.”); see also James M. Utterback & Fernando F. Suárez, Innovation, Competition, 
and Industry Structure, 22 RES. POL’Y 1, 17 (1993) (noting that while an industry’s movement toward a 
single domin
tional”). 
50  William J. Abernathy & Kim B. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction, 
14 RES. POL’Y 3, 18 (1985); see also ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 33,
TERBACK, MASTERING THE DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION 158–65 (1994). 
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development  demand, or changes 
in go
umber of research areas: 
“By
of new technologies, shifts in consumer
vernment policy.51   
A. Technological Trajectories 
Later scholars began to explore a more endogenous theory of how the 
dynamics of innovation can change based on the sociology of technology.  
The analytical foundation for this line of research is Thomas Kuhn’s semi-
nal work on the history of science, which was initially published in 1962 
and republished in subsequent editions in 1970 and 1996.  Kuhn argued that 
each field of technological inquiry tends to be organized around a scientific 
“paradigm,” which he regarded as “the entire constellation of beliefs, val-
ues, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community.”52  
After a paradigm has been established, technological progress takes the 
form of “normal science,” which focuses on solving the puzzles posed by 
the paradigm rather than challenging the paradigm itself.53  The establish-
ment of a scientific paradigm plays a key role in promoting scientific pro-
gress.  As an initial matter, paradigms serve as filters for determining what 
is relevant.54  At the same time, the paradigm “provides a map whose de-
tails are elucidated by mature scientific research.”55  Indeed, such a map 
helps organize the discipline around a discrete n
 focusing attention upon a small range of relatively esoteric problems, 
the paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a detail 
and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable.”56   
In other ways, however, paradigms restrict scientific development.  Pa-
radigms thus ensure that the field consists of researchers who “have under-
gone similar educations and professional initiations.”57  In the process, they 
establish an orthodoxy by determining “legitimate methods, problems, and 
 
THE ESSENTIAL 
TEN N AND CHANGE 293–319 (1977). 
a 
far m activity than the one that subsequent scientific development makes familiar.”). 
 
 
51  ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 33, at 27–29; Abernathy & Clark, supra note 50, at 18. 
52  THOMAS S. KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 175 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter 
KUHN, REVOLUTIONS].  Kuhn has often been criticized for the imprecision with which he used the term 
paradigm.  Margaret Masterman, The Nature of a Paradigm, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF 
KNOWLEDGE 59, 61–66 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).  Kuhn later admitted that he used 
the term paradigm too loosely and inconsistently.  KUHN, supra, at 174–82 (publishing postscript to the 
second edition originally authored in 1969); Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM 
AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra, at 231, 271–72.  In his later work, Kuhn attempted to define 
his terms more narrowly.  Thomas S. Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 459 (Frederick Suppe ed., 1977), reprinted in THOMAS S. KUHN, 
SION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITIO
53  KUHN, REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 144. 
54  See id. at 15 (“In the absence of a paradigm . . . , all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the 
development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant.  As a result, early fact-gathering is 
more nearly rando
55  Id. at 109.
56  Id. at 24. 
57  Id. at 177.
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standards of solution.”58  Moreover, during periods of normal science, each 
paradigm provides a “criterion for choosing problems that . . . can be as-
sumed to have solutions.  To a great extent these are the only problems that 
the c
ostility, and 
“pro
that technological progress results less from the efforts of the “heroic entre-
ommunity will admit as scientific or encourage its members to under-
take.”59  Moreover, paradigms induce a form of tunnel vision that can cause 
scientists to overlook or disregard data and findings that contradict the pa-
radigm: “[I]ndeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all.”60   
Kuhn further posited that every paradigm contains the seeds of its own 
destruction.61  Eventually, researchers pursuing normal science make unex-
pected discoveries that reveal anomalies that the current paradigm cannot 
explain.62  At some point, when “an anomaly comes to seem more than just 
another puzzle of normal science, the transition to crisis and to extraordi-
nary science has begun,” during which “formerly standard solutions of 
solved problems are called in question.”63  These scientific developments 
are often reinforced by social and economic forces from outside the scien-
tific community that place greater emphasis on these anomalies.64  This 
conflict induces a period of “crisis” that is often quite painful for the par-
ticipants65 and is often characterized by miscommunication, h
nounced professional insecurity.”66  Eventually a new paradigm 
emerges that can “solve the problems that have led the old one to a crisis,”67 
and the cycle of incremental technological progress—interrupted by inter-
mittent periods of radical technological change—begins again. 
A number of technology scholars have built on Kuhn’s work to offer 
more elaborate theories of technological change.  Devendra Sahal argued 
 
oncern of another 
dis
24 (“[N]ormal science possesses a built-in mechanism that ensures the relaxation of the re-
stri
ght to be solvable by known 
rule , resists the reiterated onslaught of the ablest members of the group within whose 
com ”); id. at 97 (observing the emergence of “recognized anomalies whose characteristic 
fea  assimilated to existing paradigms”). 
58  Id. at 48. 
59  Id. at 37. 
60  Id. at 24; see also id. at 5 (noting that “[n]ormal science . . . often suppresses fundamental novel-
ties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments”); id. at 37 (noting how the tech-
nical community rejects research challenging the paradigm “as metaphysical, as the c
cipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to be worth the time”); id. at 75 (noting that many new 
paradigms “had been at least partially anticipated during a period when there was no crisis in the corre-
sponding science; and in the absence of crisis those anticipations had been ignored”). 
61  Id. at 
ctions that bound research whenever the paradigm from which they derive ceases to function effec-
tively.  At that point scientists begin to behave differently and the nature of their research problems 
changes.”). 
62  See id. at 5 (noting that eventually “a normal problem, one that ou
s and procedures
petence it falls
ture is their stubborn refusal to be
63  Id. at 82–83. 
64  Id. at 181. 
65  Id. at 6, 88, 90–91. 
66  Id. at 67–68, 148–50. 
67  Id. at 153. 
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preneur” posited by neoclassical theory and more from the emergence of 
“technological guideposts” that direct subsequent research along particular 
“innovation avenues.”68  Sahal appears to have regarded the establishment 
of a 
, Richard Nelson, and Sidney Winter, Dosi also argued that once 
esta
new technological guidepost as an exogenous development, determined 
either by chance69 or by the confluence of two lines of technology that were 
previously thought to be separate.70   
More or less contemporaneously with Sahal, Giovanni Dosi put forth a 
more nuanced conception and socially determined theory of how technolo-
gies evolve.  Specifically, Dosi explicitly invoked Kuhn to argue that indus-
tries tend to be guided by “technological paradigms” that frame the way 
each field identifies the problems worth solving and the most promising 
technological solutions.71  Importantly, technological paradigms have both 
inclusionary and exclusionary effects, steering research away from certain 
directions and toward others.72  Like Kuhn, Dosi viewed the decision about 
whether to establish a technological paradigm as one driven as much by 
economic forces as by science.73  Drawing on the work of Nathan 
Rosenberg
blished, a technological paradigm guides innovation along a “techno-
logical trajectory” which creates a pattern of “normal” problem solving ac-
tivity.74   
Philip Anderson and Michael Tushman offered a similar theory that 
combined the view of “technological change . . . as a sociocultural evolu-
tionary process of variation, selection, and retention” that encompassed 
both Kuhn’s insights and dominant design theory.75  The process begins 
with the stochastic emergence of a technological breakthrough that conveys 
new and decisive cost or quality advantages.76  These radical advances 
launch what Anderson and Tushman called an “era of ferment,” during 
 
68  Devendra Sahal, Technological Guideposts and Innovation Avenues, 14 RES. POL’Y 61, 71 
(19
shaped the pattern of innovation). 
pra note 49, at 6 (noting that under Sahal’s 
the
, supra 68, at 36; Sahal, supra note 68, at 70. 
osi, Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories, 11 RES. POL’Y 147, 
152  
: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM FELLNER 57 (Bela 
Bal
l Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: 
A C . Q. 604, 605 (1990).  This paper expanded on 
the  Tushman & Anderson, supra note 35. 
 Tushman, supra note 75, at 604–05. 
85); see also DEVENDRA SAHAL, PATTERNS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 32–36 (1981) (analyz-
ing and providing examples of how technological guideposts 
69  Sahal, supra note 68, at 78–79; Utterback & Suárez, su
ory, technological guideposts emerge largely by chance). 
70  SAHAL
71  Giovanni D
 (1982).
72  Id. at 153. 
73  Id.  
74  Id. at 153–54 (citing NATHAN ROSENBERG, PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY 110–12 (1976); Ri-
chard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Dynamic Competition and Technical Progress, in ECONOMIC 
PROGRESS, PRIVATE VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
assa & Richard Nelson eds., 1977); Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, In Search of Useful The-
ory of Innovation, 6 RES. POL’Y 36, 56–57 (1977)). 
75  Philip Anderson & Michael L. Tushman, Technologica
yclical Model of Technological Change, 35 ADMN. SCI
ir earlier work.  See
76  Anderson &
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which new technologies compete both with each other and with the preced-
ing technological regime.77  The era of ferment is brought to an end by the 
adoption of a dominant design, which they equate to Sahal’s technological 
guideposts and Dosi’s technological paradigms78 and which they argue is 
selected not by technical but by social or political processes.79  After this 
point, the industry enters an “era of incremental change,” during which 
“[t]he focus of competition shifts from higher performance to lower cost 
and to differentiation via minor design variations and strategic positioning 
tactics.”80  Once entrenched, the dominant design becomes difficult to dis-
lodge, in part because of the realization of scale economies and learning by 
doing81 and in part because social structures—such as operating procedures, 
organizational power structures, and institutional frameworks—tend to rein-
force the status quo.82  Other scholars building on this work have suggested 
that network economic effects can play a similar role.83  The result is what 
som
 new era of ferment or radical 
chan
e have called “punctuated equilibria,” in which long periods of incre-
mental innovation are interrupted by periodic technological discontinui-
ties.84  Anderson and Tushman reviewed the history of four industries, 
which they concluded provided empirical support for their theories.85 
Interestingly, Anderson and Tushman emphasized that not all techno-
logical discontinuities create a paradigm shift.86  Some technological dis-
continuities are “competence-enhancing” in that they build on existing 
know-how in ways that are largely consistent with the existing technologi-
cal paradigm.87  Because competence-enhancing changes complement the 
status quo, they are less likely to trigger a
ges to industry structure.88  Other technological discontinuities are 
“competence-destroying,” in that they require new skills, abilities, and 
 
2. 
8 (citing PORTER, supra note 44). 
 Suárez, supra note 49, at 7; see also Abernathy & Clark, supra 
not
 Anderson, supra note 35, at 442–
46, 50).  They extended their analysis in Anderson & 
Tus ote 75, at 609–10, 612–13, 617, 621, 623, 625–26. 
 Anderson, supra note 35, at 442. 
77  Id. at 610–1
78  Id. at 613. 
79  Id. at 617. 
80  Id. at 617–1
81  Id. at 614. 
82  Id. at 618. 
83  Murmann & Frenken, supra note 43, at 935; Steven Klepper, Industry Life Cycles, 6 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE 145, 150 (1997); Suárez, supra note 43, at 274. 
84  Tushman & Anderson, supra note 35, at 439–41, 444, 450, 455, 460; Ron Adner, When Are 
Technologies Disruptive?  A Demand-Based View of the Emergence of Competition, 23 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 667, 667 (2002); Utterback &
e 50, at 14 (“[T]he advancement of science is characterized by long periods of regular development, 
punctuated by periods of revolution.”). 
85  Anderson & Tushman, supra note 75, at 618–27; see also Tushman & Anderson, supra note 35, 
at 450–59 (finding empirical support in the history of the minicomputer, cement, and airline industries). 
86  Anderson and Tushman introduced this concept in Tushman &
 460–62 (citing Abernathy & Clark, supra note 
hman, supra n
87  Tushman &
88  Id. at 445. 
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knowledge.89  It is these changes that initiate periods of technological fer-
ment and that disrupt industry structure.90   
Importantly, Anderson and Tushman underscore that because techno-
logical dominance cannot be known in advance, it will be determined 
largely by intraorganizational political processes.91  The inherent uncertain-
ty surrounding the likely success of any particular technological advance 
means that the adoption of an industry standard depends on social, political, 
and organizational processes more than technical merit.92  In short, “[t]he 
passage of an industry from ferment to order is not an engineering issue as 
much as a sociological one” that involves “a complicated array of organiza-
tional and collective forces,” including strategic alliances, industry associa-
tions, and governm ustry standard becomes 
entr
 of interdependent 
tech
ent agencies.93  Once an ind
enched, scale economies and learning by doing make it very hard to dis-
lodge.94 
B. Design Hierarchies 
Another line of research examined how technological change is shaped 
by what Kim Clark called “design hierarchies.”95  Drawing on the work of 
Nathan Rosenberg, Clark noted that most innovations are not standalone 
technological developments, but rather part of a web
nological processes.96  In addition, not all of the various components 
that make up these technological processes are of equal importance.  Some 
are central or core, in that they affect all others within the domain.  These 
concepts are placed at the top of the design hierarchy.97 
The emergence of a particular design hierarchy establishes a technical 
agenda for a particular product’s development that directs further innova-
tion along particular lines.98  Once the technological agenda has been set, 
production processes become more focused and specialized.99  Moreover, 
the hierarchical nature of the design systems has a tendency to facilitate cer-
tain types of innovation and to obstruct others.  Specifically, innovations 
that refine the concepts established by the existing hierarchy (which Clark 
called movements “down” the design hierarchy), are relatively easy to de-
 
89  Id. at 442. 
6, 461–62. 
shman, supra note 75, at 605–06, 611, 616–17, 627–28. 
8. 
Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evo-
luti
iting ROSENBERG, supra note 74, at 108–25). 
t 243. 
90  Id. at 444–4
91  Id. at 462. 
92  Anderson & Tu
93  Id. at 627–2
94  Id. at 614. 
95  Kim B. Clark, The Interaction of 
on, 14 RES. POL’Y 235, 235 (1985). 
96  Id. at 237 (c
97  Id. a
98  Id. 
99  Id. at 247. 
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ploy, as they reinforce and strengthen existing commitments.100  Innovations 
that depart from existing approaches and challenge the core elements that 
define the design hierarchy (which Clark called movements “up” the design 
hierarchy) can be more difficult to realize in that they destroy the value of 
established commitments and competence.101  Later scholars have taken a 
more network-based approach that views the importance of a particular 
conc
 particular component.  Second, it requires architectural 
know
-
tive.105  Conversely, innovations that require significant changes to both 
component and architectural knowledge (“radical innovation”) pose the 
greatest challenges to established firms, since it is these types of innova-
tions that are most destructive to established firms’ existing capabilities.106 
ept not in terms of its level of generality within a conceptual hierarchy, 
but rather the extent of a concept’s interconnections with other concepts, 
with changes to core concepts having a significantly lower probability of 
success.102 
Clark refined this analysis and added an institutional dimension to this 
framework in subsequent work co-authored with Rebecca Henderson.103  
They note that integrating components into a system requires two distinct 
types of knowledge: “First, it requires component knowledge, or knowledge 
about each of the core design concepts and the way in which they are im-
plemented in a
ledge or knowledge about the ways in which the components are inte-
grated and linked together into a coherent whole.”104  These analytical con-
structs yield the following two-by-two matrix for identifying distinct types 
of innovation. 
Innovations can have dramatically different impacts on competition 
depending on the extent to which they change each type of knowledge.  
Obviously, innovations that reinforce current component knowledge and do 
not require significant changes to current architectural knowledge (which 
Henderson and Clark called “incremental innovation”) are the least disrup
 
100  Id. at 249. 
101  Id. 
102  Murmann & Frenken, supra note 43, at 940–42; see also Michael L. Tushman & Johann Peter 
Murmann, Dominant Designs, Technology Cycles, and Organizational Outcomes, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 
231, 249–51 (1998) (noting that “products are composed of hierarchically ordered subsystems that are 
coupled together by linking mechanisms” in which “core subsystems are either tightly connected to oth-
er subsystems or represent a strategic performance bottleneck,” while “a peripheral subsystem is one 
that is only weakly connected to other subsystems”); Michael L. Tushman & Lori Rosenkopf, Organiza-
tional Determinants of Technological Change: Toward a Sociology of Technological Evolution, 14 RES. 
ORG. BEHAV. 311, 334 (1992) (“Not all subsystems are of equal importance. Those subsystems with 
greater linkages to other subsystems are more central to the system than those subsystems that are pe-
ripheral.”). 
103  Henderson & Clark, supra note 35.  This article refined ideas initially explored in Abernathy & 
Clark, supra note 50, at 7–13. 
104  Henderson & Clark, supra note 35, at 11. 
105  Id. at 13. 
106  Id. 
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Figure 3: Interactions in Changes in Component and Architectural 
Knowledge107 
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What is most illuminating is a comparison of the two diagonal boxes of 
the matrix.  Firms accommodate changes to components that do not require 
changes to the system’s architecture (“modular innovation”) relatively eas-
ily.108  Interestingly, it is innovations that change the architecture without 
changing the components (“architectural innovation”) that pose the greatest 
challenges.109  The emergence of a dominant design tends to stabilize archi-
tectural knowledge and leads firms to stop focusing on alternative architec-
tural configurations and instead concentrate on improving the components 
within the context of the existing configuration.110  Moreover, once a par-
ticular architectural vision becomes dominant, “it tends to become embed-
ded in the practices and procedures of the organization.”111  In particular, 
“an organization’s communication channels will come to embody its archi-
tectural knowledge of the linkages between components that are critical to 
effective design.”112  In addition, the filters that organizations employ to 
manage the constant barrage of information also come to embody its archi-
tectural knowledge.113  Yet these structures mean that information about 
changes in the manner in which components relate to one another might be-
come screened out.  As Henderson and Clark noted, “organizations facing 
threats may continue to rely on their old frameworks—or in our terms on 
their old architectural knowledge—and hence misunderstand the nature of a 
 
107  Id. at 12 fig.1. 
108  Id. at 12. 
109  Id. at 13. 
110  Id. at 14–15. 
111  Id. at 15. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. 
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threat.  They shoehorn the bad news, or the unexpected new information, 
back into the patterns with which they are familiar.”114  This systematic, in-
stitutional commitment to the status quo makes it harder for established 
firms to recognize when change is necessary and make it more costly for 
them to retool.115 
One potential solution to the complexities of design hierarchies is 
modularity.  Clayton Christensen has linked the emergence of modularity to 
the product life cycle.116  During the initial stages of a technology, when 
firms cannot yet meet most consumers’ demands for performance, the need 
to maximize the potential of the existing technology leads firms to experi-
ment with new and untested configurations of components.117  As a result, 
firms tend to employ nonstandardized, highly interdependent, and proprie-
tary architectures, rather than modular architectures.118  This characteristic 
may be attributed to the fact that standardization would necessarily force 
firms away from the technological frontier.119  In addition, product design-
ers need to be free to engage in an unstructured technical dialogue that is 
not tied to any particular architectural conception.120  Once the functionality 
of the available products begins to exceed customers’ expectations, the fo-
cus of competition shifts away from functionality and toward other consid-
erations, such as speed of service, flexibility, customization, and price, 
which makes modular architectures better suited to the business environ-
men
industry organizations or regulatory agencies, adopting a modular architec-
t.121   
However, even proponents of modularity recognize the theory’s limits.  
For example, certain tasks may be so interdependent that they require a 
higher degree of coordination than modular architectures allow.122  Modu-
larization also limits producers’ ability to compete on the basis of cost or 
superior design123 and tends to create information silos.124  Because the stan-
dards needed to implement a modular approach are typically established by 
 
114  Id. at 17 (citations omitted). 
115  Id. at 17–18. 
116  CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 209, 217–18 (1997). 
117  Clayton M. Christensen et al., Disruption, Disintegration and the Dissipation of Differentiabil-
ity, 11 INDUS & CORP. CHANGE 955, 961–62 (2002). 
118  Id. at 962. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. at 964–65; CHRISTENSEN, supra note 116, at 214–15, 218–19. 
122  Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From?  Modularity, Transactions and the 
Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 155, 180–86 (2008); Henry W. Chesbrough & David 
J. Teece, When Is Virtual Virtuous?: Organizing for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1996, at 
65, 70; MICHAEL E. RAYNOR & CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, DELOITTE RESEARCH, INTEGRATE TO 
INNOVATE 16–19 (2002), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-SouthAfrica/Local%20 
Assets/Documents/I2I(1).pdf. 
123  Christensen et al., supra note 117, at 977. 
124  Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 122, at 65–66. 
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ture in effect subjects that industry to bureaucratic control.125  Perhaps most 
importantly, changes in the technological and economic environment can 
lead two previously distinct modules to be provided more efficiently by a 
single integrated system.  This occurred, for example, when computers be-
gan to integrate functions previously performed by peripheral devices into 
their primary CPUs126 and when cable modem and DSL providers began to 
offer services that consolidated both last-mile and middle-mile functional-
ity.127  Technological and economic changes can also put pressure on the 
industry to evolve toward a fundamentally different architecture.128  The 
danger is that modularization may inhibit systemic innovation by creating 
organizational structures and economic pressures that tend to lock the exist-
ing interfaces into place.129   
 
 * * * 
 
Together, these sociological theories have important implications for 
how technological innovation emerges in mature industries.  A number of 
basic economic factors, such as scale economies, learning by doing, and 
network economic effects, make transformative change particularly difficult 
after a technology has coalesced around a particular paradigm.  Moreover, 
paradigms and institutional structures tend to retard radical architectural 
changes by framing and filtering the way that researchers and organizations 
perceive new technological developments and information.  These problems 
are likely to be particularly severe for innovations challenging an en-
trenched design hierarchy, in which the interdependence of multiple subsys-
tems is particularly resistant to change and many researchers and industry 
players have professional and economic investments in the status quo.  
These effects can limit the number of dimensions along which firms can 
compete and can prevent new architectural approaches from emerging. 
 
125  See RAYNOR & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 122, at 19 (“Companies that are integrated across 
modular interfaces suffer from the inefficiencies that seem inevitably to stem from the heavy hand of 
bureaucratic control.”). 
126  See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382–83 (9th Cir. 1983); Cal. 
Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979); ILC Peripherals Leading Corp. 
v. IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 231–32 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d sub nom., Memorex Corp. v. IBM 
Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 342 
(N.D. Okla. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). 
127  Yoo, Comment on End-to-End, supra note 16, at 33–34. 
128  Baldwin, supra note 122, at 180; Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 122, at 68; Michael G. Jaco-
bides & Sidney G. Winter, The Co-Evolution of Capabilities and Transaction Costs: Explaining the In-
stitutional Structure of Production, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 395, 405 (2005). 
129  Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 122, at 65–66; Jacobides & Winter, supra note 128, at 404. 
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IV. COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS AND THE IMPACT OF MARKET 
MATURATION ON INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
Although the literature on market maturation has focused primarily on 
the nature of competition and innovation, it also has implications for indus-
try structure.  This Part considers the impact of market maturation on hori-
zontal market concentration, the relative benefits of incumbency for 
innovation, and vertical market structure in turn. 
A. Horizontal Market Structure 
Market maturation theory has embedded in it a particular vision of how 
the horizontal market structure of an industry will evolve.  For example, 
product life cycle theory predicts that the prospect of strong sales growth 
will attract a substantial number of new firms to enter the market during the 
growth stage.  As the market enters the maturity phase, the increase in price 
competition causes an industry shakeout as market participants merge or 
exit the market.130   
Dominant design theory offers similar predictions about the evolution 
of horizontal market structure.  During the initial stage, when product de-
sign is in flux, entry by new competitors deconcentrates the market.131  
Throughout this period of flux, newer, smaller firms utilizing flexible, la-
bor-intensive production processes have the advantage over larger firms, 
which rely on more specialized, high-volume production processes.132  The 
internal organization and communications structure of large firms tend to 
make them less able to adjust to this dynamic environment. 
The shift in the nature of competition after a dominant design emerges 
tips the competitive balance in favor of larger firms.  Market adoption of a 
design paradigm causes research and development to become less entrepre-
neurial and more science-driven and systematic.133  At the same time, prod-
uct standardization limits firms’ ability to use product innovation as a 
source of competitive advantage.  Competition increasingly focuses on 
price, which in turn rewards those firms that can improve their production 
 
130  GRANT, supra note 17, at 271, 272; KOTLER & KELLER, supra note 17, at 282–83, 289; PORTER, 
supra note 17, at 161 (citing T.A. STAUDT, D. TAYLOR & D. BOWERSOX, A MANAGERIAL 
INTRODUCTION TO MARKETING 232–33 (3d ed. 1976); L.T. Wells, Jr., International Trade: The Product 
Life Cycle Approach, in THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3, 10 (Louis T. Wells, 
Jr., ed., 1972)). 
131  UTTERBACK, supra note 50, at 30–31, 33–47; Utterback & Suárez, supra note 49, at 1, 5; see al-
so Michael Gort & Steven Klepper, Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations, 92 ECON. J. 
630, 631 (1982) (providing analytical support for the rapid growth in the number of producers during the 
early stages following the introduction of a new product); Mueller & Tilton, supra note 31, at 574 
(“[O]ne usually expects a rush of firms entering a newly formed industry.”). 
132  Abernathy & Utterback, Industrial Innovation, supra note 31, at 42, 44; Mueller & Tilton, supra 
note 31, at 574; Utterback & Suárez, supra note 49, at 1, 5. 
133  Abernathy & Utterback, Industrial Innovation, supra note 31, at 45; Mueller & Tilton, supra 
note 31, at 576–77. 
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processes and can best realize economies of scale.134  In addition, as dis-
cussed in the next section, larger firms are more likely to possess the com-
plementary assets needed to commercialize the innovation.135  The resulting 
emphasis on economies of scale and scope causes an industry shakeout,136 
resulting in what Dosi calls “oligopolistic maturity.”137  A recent survey of 
the literature on dominant designs finds strong empirical support for the 
idea that industries will tend to follow this inverted-U pattern of entry and 
exit.138  Thus, market maturation theory posits that markets will grow in-
creasingly concentrated as the industry matures regardless of whether one 
applies the demand-driven approach underlying product life cycle theory or 
the more technologically oriented approach embodied in dominant design 
theory. 
B. Vertical Market Structure 
To date, product life cycle and dominant design theorists have devoted 
relatively little attention to vertical market structure.139  The initial work 
adopted a fairly simplistic approach, positing that the emergence of a domi-
nant design would lead to an increase in vertical integration as firms try to 
assert greater control over their production processes.140  Later scholars rec-
ognized that firms could accomplish the same objectives through contracts 
establishing closer relationships with suppliers and distributors instead of 
through formal vertical integration.141  Commentators attempting to assess 
the empirical evidence on vertical integration found it to be mixed on this 
point.142 
A line of research initiated by David Teece drew upon the insights of 
transaction cost economics to offer a more refined theory of vertical market 
structure.  Teece’s work sought to solve a persistent riddle of innovation:  
Why, despite the presence of strong first-mover advantages, do initial inno-
 
134  Klepper, supra note 35, at 573–74, 580. 
135  David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collabo-
ration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 301 (1986). 
136  ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 33, at 131–32; UTTERBACK, supra note 50, at 30–31, 33–47, 87–
88; Klepper, supra note 35, at 562, 564, 574; Utterback & Suárez, supra note 49, at 5. 
137  Dosi, supra note 71, at 157. 
138  Murmann & Frenken, supra note 43, at 931. 
139  Klepper, supra note 83, at 152. 
140  UTTERBACK, supra note 50, at 90; Utterback & Suárez, supra note 49, at 4 (observing that 
Abernathy & Utterback, Industrial Innovation, supra note 31, considered vertical integration to be an 
“inevitable outcome of technological evolution in an industry”).  This conclusion contrasts with George 
Stigler’s assertion that maturing industries would exhibit greater vertical disintegration, as the growth of 
sales volumes made greater specialization possible.  See George Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Lim-
ited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 185, 190 (1951). 
141  Utterback & Suárez, supra note 49, at 4, 18. 
142  See Klepper, supra note 83, at 159, 164 (finding that although the auto industry exhibited greater 
vertical integration as it matured, six other industries did not follow any consistent pattern of vertical 
integration). 
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vators so often lose to follow-on competitors?143  The traditional analysis 
focused almost exclusively on the presence of patent protection or some 
other means for ensuring that the initial innovator is able to appropriate the 
lion’s share of the available surplus.144 
While Teece recognized the importance of appropriability,145 he 
pointed out that there was another force at work.  Teece observed that inno-
vations generally are not products in and of themselves.  Most must be 
combined with other complementary assets before they can be commercial-
ized.146  In such cases, the commercial success of an innovation depends not 
only on the strength of the appropriability regime, but also on the innova-
tor’s ability to bargain effectively with the firms that control these key 
complementary assets.147 
Complementary assets do not play a significant role during the initial 
stages of a technology’s deployment, since during that time the emphasis is 
on identifying the optimal product design rather than improving production 
processes.148  Moreover, production volumes are so low prior to that time 
that investments in complementary assets are unlikely to yield significant 
benefits.149  The situation changes radically once a dominant design has 
emerged.  At this point, access to complementary assets becomes a critical 
success factor.150  An innovator with an ironclad, patent-protected monop-
oly in a particular technology may have to bargain with another monopolist 
with exclusive control over a complementary asset that is critical to the 
technology’s commercialization.151  The owner of the complementary asset 
may be in a stronger bargaining position than the owner of the new technol-
ogy, in which case the owner of the complementary asset is more likely to 
capture the lion’s share of the benefits created by the new technology.152 
The strength of the innovator’s bargaining position also depends on 
whether the complementary assets in question are specialized or generic.  If 
the complementary assets needed to commercialize the innovation are ge-
neric, the market is likely to be competitive, and the complementary asset 
owner will not have to bear the risk of making significant relationship-
 
143  Teece, supra note 135, at 285. 
144  See Giovanni Dosi, Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation, 26 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1120, 1139 (1988) (reviewing the literature).  Other bases of appropriability include trade 
secrets, lead times, costs of duplication, learning-curve effects, and superior sales and service efforts.  
Id. 
145  See Teece, supra note 135, at 287, 290–92. 
146  Id. at 288. 
147  Id. at 291–92. 
148  Id. at 291. 
149  Id. 
150  Id.; see also Suarez, supra note 43, at 282 (noting that complementary asset providers become 
more important as the market for the dominant design grows). 
151  Teece, supra note 135, at 292. 
152  Id. 
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specific investments.153  Under these circumstances, the innovator should 
have little trouble negotiating contracts to obtain access to those assets.154   
Bargaining becomes considerably more complicated when the com-
plementary assets needed to commercialize the innovation are specialized.  
As an initial matter, owners of specialized complementary assets are more 
likely to possess market power.  If so, they will inherently possess greater 
bargaining power and will be in a better position to appropriate a greater 
proportion of the surplus.155  Moreover, contracting is likely to be especially 
difficult if a contract requires the owner of the complementary asset to un-
dertake irreversible investments that would be valueless if the relationship 
between the innovator and the complementary asset owner were to fall 
apart.156  When that is the case, the owner of the complementary asset may 
have to be given some ex ante assurances before undertaking such invest-
ments.157  In addition, the parties are vulnerable to being held up ex post.158   
The classic solution to this problem is for the innovator to eliminate the 
need to bargain by vertically integrating and provide all of the complemen-
tary assets needed to commercialize the invention itself.159  That said, verti-
cal integration is expensive—a burden that is likely to weigh particularly 
heavily on startups.160  Requiring all firms to obtain access to complemen-
tary assets through vertical integration would have the inevitable effect of 
raising the cost of entry, which in turn would render the market less com-
petitive.161  Innovators can avoid these costs by foregoing formal vertical in-
tegration and instead entering into strategic partnerships with providers of 
complementary assets.162  Although the presence of relationship-specific in-
vestments may cause risks of opportunistic abuse so severe as to render 
contractual solutions untenable, under the proper circumstances strategic 
partnerships can represent an alternative institutional solution that facilitates 
innovators’ commercialization of their products.163 
 
153  Id. at 291. 
154  Id. at 290, 291. 
155  Id. at 292. 
156  Id. at 294. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. at 290; see also Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, The Product Market and the Market for 
“Ideas”: Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 RES. POL’Y 333, 334, 339–40 
(2003) (describing how firms that control specialized complementary assets necessary to commercialize 
an innovation can act opportunistically to “hold up” the innovation); Scott Shane, Technology Regimes 
and New Firm Formation, 47 MGMT. SCI. 1173, 1177 (2001) (describing how specialized complemen-
tary assets can provide advantages to incumbents). 
159  Teece, supra note 135, at 290, 295. 
160  Id. at 293. 
161  Id. at 302. 
162  Id. at 293–94. 
163  Id. at 294. 
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This perspective suggests that the growing use of strategic partnerships 
may be nothing more than a natural part of a market’s evolution after it ma-
tures.  Thus, Teece concludes that strategic partnerships “ought to be seen 
not as attempts to stifle competition, but as mechanisms for lowering entry 
requirements for innovators.”164 
Other scholars have explored alternative ways to reduce the transaction 
costs of obtaining access to complementary assets aside from vertical inte-
gration and vertical contracting.  In particular, these scholars suggest that 
modularity can create “technologically separable interfaces” that permit in-
ter-firm transactions in places where they otherwise could not occur.165  
Through this process, modularity makes it possible for small, non-vertically 
integrated firms to specialize in ways that allow them to maximize the bene-
fits of their technical expertise.166   
As noted earlier, however, modularity facilitates innovation within the 
context of the existing architecture at the expense of inhibiting innovations 
that would transform the existing architecture.  Many modularity scholars 
have argued that vertically integrated companies are better at systemic in-
novations,167 with integrated solutions being more appropriate when the ar-
chitecture is interdependent, knitting together component pieces.168  In 
addition, the unstructured technical dialogue on which architectural innova-
tion depends may best be undertaken within the boundaries of a firm.169  In-
tegrated firms may be better positioned to manage the subsequent 
fluctuations between interdependence and modularity.170  
V. MARKET MATURATION THEORY’S IMPLICATIONS  
FOR INTERNET POLICY 
Market maturation theory would appear to have clear implications for 
U.S. Internet policy.  The empirical data on the penetration rates of U.S. 
Internet usage collected by the International Telecommunication Union and 
 
164  Id. at 302. 
165  ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 104, 254–55 (2001); CARLISS BALDWIN & 
KIM CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY 372, 383 (2000); Baldwin, supra note 122, at 
155, 174–75, 179, 187; Jacobides & Winter, supra note 128, at 402. 
166  ARORA ET AL., supra note 165, at 254–55; Christensen et al., supra note 117, at 964–65, 985; 
Jacobides & Winter, supra note 128, at 403–04; see also Klepper, supra note 83, at 169–74 (providing 
empirical support for such specialized firms in maturity). 
167  Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 122, at 65. 
168  See RAYNOR & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 122, at 16–19. 
169  Christensen et al., supra note 117, at 962–63. 
170  H.W. Chesbrough & K. Kusunoki, The Modularity Trap: Innovation, Technology Phase Shifts 
and the Resulting Limits of Virtual Organizations, in MANAGING INDUSTRIAL KNOWLEDGE 202, 227 
(Ikujiro Nonaka & David J. Teece eds., 2001); Christensen et al., supra note 117, at 975. 
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by the Pew Research Center indicate that penetration stands at between 
76% and 79%.171   
 
 
Figure 4: Penetration of U.S. Internet Usage172 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measured solely in terms of broadband connections, U.S. subscriber-
ship has risen rapidly over the past decade.  But the growth rate began to 
taper off in June 2008, as the growth curve passed the inflection point, sug-
gesting that the market may be approaching saturation and may be starting 
to enter its mature phase.173 
 
 
171  Int’l Telecomm. Union, United States ICT Statistics (2009), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/ 
DisplayCountry.aspx?countryId=244 (76.24 users per 100 inhabitants in 2008); PEW INTERNET & 
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, TREND DATA: USAGE OVER TIME (2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-
Data/Usage-Over-Time.aspx (select “Usage Over Time” spreadsheet) (indicating 74% internet adoption 
in December 2008). 
172  Int’l Telecomm. Union, ICT Statistics Database (2008), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/ 
Indicators/Indicators.aspx (select year in dropdown box and click “4. Internet indicators”); PEW 
INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, supra note 171. 
173  The FCC this year issued broadband adoption data for December 2008.  Unfortunately, because 
of a change in methodology, these data are not comparable to preceding data.  FCC, HIGH-SPEED 
SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 3–4 (Feb. 2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296239A1.pdf. 
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Figure 5: U.S. Broadband Subscribers (millions)174  
 
 
 
 
On a technological level, the Internet initially served as an experimen-
tal testbed that allowed researchers to try out a wide variety of network 
technologies.175  Moreover, the fact that the Internet was initially sponsored 
by the Defense Department meant that the architecture placed little empha-
sis on efficiency or on how costs were allocated.176  The commercialization 
of the Internet and its emergence as a mass market phenomenon is naturally 
leading network providers to deploy increasingly specialized equipment and 
to place greater emphasis on cost, efficiency, and accountability. 
Thus, as the market matures, policymakers should expect firms to shift 
from extensive to intensive competition and to focus on reducing costs and 
customizing offerings to deliver greater value to existing customers through 
differentiation and bundling of services, as reflected by last-mile providers’ 
growing interest in monetizing video streams.  Indeed, market maturation 
theory reminds us that product differentiation can represent an important 
 
174  FCC, HIGH-SPEED ACCESS FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2008 tbl.1 (July 
2009), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/ 
hspd0608_tables.xls. 
175  Juan D. Rogers, Internetworking and the Politics of Science: NSFNET in Internet History, 14 
INFO. SOC’Y 213, 215 (1998). 
176  David D. Clark, The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols, 18 ACM SIGCOMM 
COMPUTER COMMC’NS REV., Aug. 1988, at 106, 107, 110. 
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source of competitive rivalry.177  The theory also suggests that policymakers 
should be tolerant of new institutional relationships, particularly the grow-
ing use of more strategic partnerships.  The Internet is characterized by pre-
cisely the type of relationship-specific investments that counsel in favor of 
such strategic partnerships.178  Finally, the impediments to architectural in-
novation that surround industries characterized by elaborate and complex 
design hierarchies suggests that policymakers should be concerned that in-
dustry players will engage in too little architectural innovation and experi-
mentation rather than too much.  The growing consensus in the engineering 
literature is that the Internet is in need of significant architectural change, 
but that the network seems incapable of evolving out of its current architec-
ture.179   
Before condemning particular deviations from the current architecture 
as harmful to competition and innovation, one should bear in mind that the 
general concern raised by the literature on network economic effects is that 
networks to can be too slow to adopt new technologies where the presence 
of a large installed base causes the network to remain locked into a standard 
long after it has become obsolete.180  One should also bear in mind that ex-
perimentation and competition over standards are generally regarded as 
signs of innovative health181 and that “divided technical leadership,” in 
which firms operating in adjacent markets with similar technical and mar-
keting capabilities attempt to seize control over key platform elements, can 
represent an important source of competition during Kuhnian eras of nor-
mal science.182  Consequently, regulatory intervention that locks the inter-
faces between the various components of the design hierarchy into place 
might actually serve to dampen rivalry rather than enhance it. 
Market maturation theory is subject to a number of limitations.  De-
spite the popularity of the various market maturation theories and the atten-
tion that management scholars have focused on them, these theories to date 
have been somewhat disappointing as a guide for managerial decisionmak-
ing.  As an initial matter, critics have raised questions about the market ma-
 
177  Ron Adner & Daniel Levinthal, Demand Heterogeneity and Technology Evolution: Implications 
for Product and Process Innovation, 47 MGMT. SCI. 611, 623 (2001).   
178  Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. 
ON REG. 171, 260–65 (2002). 
179  See Paul Laskowski & John Chuang, A Leap of Faith?  From Large-Scale Testbed to the Global 
Internet 2 (2009) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 37th Annual Telecomm. Pol’y Res. Conf.), 
available at http://www.tprcweb.com/images/stories/papers/Laskowski_2009.pdf (collecting sources). 
180  Yoo, supra note 8, at 244. 
181  Shane Greenstein, Glimmers and Signs of Innovative Health in the Commercial Internet: A Re-
flective Essay, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 25, 42–55 (2010). 
182  Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future Structure of the 
Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN 
THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155, 166–69, 172–73, 199–203 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard 
eds., 1999). 
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turation theory’s generality.  For example, although reviews of the empiri-
cal literature on the product life cycle have concluded that most industries 
conform to the pattern depicted in Figure 1, critics recognize that many 
studies reflect a wide variety of other patterns.183  Similarly, many empirical 
tests have failed to bear out the dropoff in innovation or the shift from 
product to process innovation predicted by dominant design theory.184 
The somewhat inconclusive state of the empirical record is partly at-
tributable to the considerable confusion about the proper unit of analysis.  
For example, under product life cycle theory, it is unclear whether products 
should be aggregated at the level of the brand (e.g., Miller), product form 
(e.g., light beer), or product (e.g., beer).185  With respect to dominant design 
theories, studies have struggled to determine what constitutes a dominant 
design.186  In addition, studies have varied the unit of analysis, with some 
analyzing technologies at the product level and others analyzing technolo-
gies at the subsystem level.187  The difficulty in identifying the key turning 
points has led some scholars to criticize market maturation as only know-
able in retrospect,188 which greatly limits its usefulness to business strate-
gists. 
Dominant design theory also assumes that some degree of technologi-
cal product differentiation is possible.  Otherwise, products will standardize 
quickly without passing through any extended period of uncertainty.  Fur-
thermore, in assuming that products will standardize and firms will compete 
increasingly on the basis of price, the dynamics posited by market matura-
tion theory also implicitly assume that consumer preferences are homoge-
neous.189  Heterogeneity of consumer preferences can prevent a dominant 
 
183  See KOTLER & KELLER, supra note 17, at 278–79; Rink & Swan, supra note 19, at 221–22; Ge-
rald J. Tellis & C. Merle Crawford, An Evolutionary Approach to Product Growth Theory, J. 
MARKETING, Fall 1981, at 125, 126. 
184  For studies finding continued innovation after maturity, see Adner & Levinthal, supra note 177, 
at 623; Clayton M. Christensen, Exploring the Limits of the Technology S-Curve, 1 PRODUCTION & 
OPERATIONS MGMT. 334, 338–41 (1992); Rebecca Henderson, Of Life Cycles Real and Imaginary: The 
Unexpectedly Long Old Age of Optical Lithography, 24 RES. POL’Y 631, 634 (1995); Klepper, supra 
note 83, at 158–60, 167–68.  For studies failing to find a shift from product to process innovation after 
maturity, see Adner & Levinthal, supra note 177, at 623; C. De Bresson & J. Townsend, Multivariate 
Models for Innovation—Looking at the Abernathy-Utterback Model with Other Data, 9 OMEGA INT’L J. 
MGMT. SCI. 429, 435 (1981); Klepper, supra note 83, at 175. 
185  Day, supra note 25, at 61; Dhalla & Yuspeh, supra note 20, at 103–04, 105; Rink & Swan, su-
pra note 19, at 225–27. 
186  Murmann & Frenken, supra note 43, at 933. 
187  Id. at 933–34. 
188  Tushman & Anderson, supra note 35, at 443; see also Carliss Baldwin et al., How User Innova-
tions Become Commercial Products: A Theoretical Investigation and Case Study, 35 RES. POL’Y 1291, 
1293 (2006) (noting criticism of the dominant design theory for its ambiguity and its dependence on post 
hoc appraisals); Dhalla & Yuspeh, supra note 20, at 102–08 (criticizing the utility of product life cycle 
theory as a predictive tool). 
189  PORTER, supra note 44, at 196. 
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design from ever emerging.190  Moreover, demand heterogeneity may lead 
firms to continue to make product improvements in maturity.191  In addition, 
the market structure predicted by market maturation theory depends on the 
presence of significant economies of scale, since the continued viability of 
custom manufacturing would permit small firms to continue to survive.192   
Most importantly, market maturation theory has struggled to find a 
theory of market renewal.  As Theodore Levitt demonstrated, firms can of-
ten find new uses for a product that can revitalize and restart the product life 
cycle.193  However, product life cycle theory provides no basis for analyzing 
when that might occur.  Similarly, Abernathy and Utterback’s initial expo-
sition of dominant design theory presumed that a dominant design would 
arise only once in the history of any industry.194  Since that time, they rec-
ognized that industries may go through different cycles.195   
The problems associated with employing market maturation theory as a 
guide for business strategy do not necessarily undercut its usefulness as a 
guide for regulatory policy.  Unlike business managers, policymakers need 
not determine in advance the precise moments when the nature of competi-
tion and innovation will change or which technology will emerge as domi-
nant.  Rather than trying to manage the details of these technological 
transitions, policymakers can simply focus on creating regulatory structures 
that are flexible enough to allow the industry to evolve as it matures and to 
give firms the room to experiment with new solutions to whatever changes 
in the business environment may arise, as would be accomplished by a 
case-by-case approach that places the burden of proof on the party challeng-
ing the practice in question.196  More aggressive intervention would have 
the unfortunate effect of preventing ambiguous practices from going for-
ward and runs the risk of biasing technological choices or creating barriers 
 
190  Anderson & Tushman, supra note 75, at 628. 
191  Adner & Levinthal, supra note 177, at 623, 625. 
192  See PORTER, supra note 44, at 195–96; De Bresson & Townsend, supra note 184, at 435. 
193  Levitt, supra note 17, at 87–93. 
194  See Murmann & Frenken, supra note 43, at 935. 
195  ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 33, at 27–29; UTTERBACK, supra note 50, at 158–65; Philip 
Anderson & Michael L. Tushman, Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical 
Model of Technological Change, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 604, 605 (1990); Kim B. Clark, Competition, Tech-
nical Diversity, and Radical Innovation in the U.S. Auto Industry, 1 RES. ON TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. 
& POL’Y 103, 105 (Richard S. Rosenbloom ed., 1983). 
196  For my previous work advocating an ex post, case-by-case approach, see Yoo, Comment on 
End-to-End, supra note 16, at 43–46, 58–59; Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 16, at 7–8, 
24, 75–76; Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 16, at 1854–55, 1900, 1908; Yoo, supra note 8, at 
186–87, 212, 227, 238, 246–47, 257, 261; Yoo, supra note 5.  The FCC’s recent Comcast order em-
braced such a case-by-case approach.  Comcast Order, supra note 1, at 13044–50 ¶¶ 28–40.  In a recent 
speech, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski expressed his support for a case-by-case approach.  Julius 
Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A Platform for 
Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity, Prepared Remarks at the Brookings Institution (Sept. 21, 
2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-293568A1.pdf. 
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to innovation by increasing costs or uncertainty.197  A more measured, case-
by-case approach that places the burden of proof on the party challenging 
the practice in question would seem to strike a better balance between per-
mitting business practices to evolve with the changing conditions while also 
providing a remedy for any anticompetitive harms that may emerge. 
 
 
 
197  ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., REGULATORY REFORM AND INNOVATION 
12 (1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/61/2102514.pdf; Utterback & Abernathy, su-
pra note 31, at 46. 
